A Premature Solution: Legislative Reaction to the Debate Over Internet Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement by Daub, Joshua Alan
Volume 103 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 103, 
1998-1999 
10-1-1998 
A Premature Solution: Legislative Reaction to the Debate Over 
Internet Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement 
Joshua Alan Daub 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua A. Daub, A Premature Solution: Legislative Reaction to the Debate Over Internet Service Provider 
Liability for Copyright Infringement, 103 DICK. L. REV. 199 (1998). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol103/iss1/9 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
A Premature Solution: Legislative
Reaction to the Debate Over Internet
Service Provider Liability for Copyright
Infringement*
I. Introduction
Copyright law seeks to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts" by granting to authors limited control over the use and
dissemination of their works.' When a person engages in an
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work, that person is said to have
infringed on the copyright, and may face both civil and criminal
liability.2 Furthermore, a person who facilitates or contributes to
the infringing activity of others may be liable as well.3
The Internet provides unprecedented access to intellectual
property by making the widespread distribution of information easy
and inexpensive.4 When this information consists of copyrighted
material, the distribution may implicate the rights granted by
copyright law.' Thus, the complex system of rights and responsibil-
ities created by copyright law is forced to adapt to the Internet's
rapid growth, enormous scale, and unique nature.6
* Author's note: Shortly before this Comment was published, President Clinton signed
a different bill limiting Internet service provider liability for copyright infringement. See
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, P.L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (adding § 512 to the
Copyright Act). The new law is more coherent than the bills analyzed in this Comment.
Nevertheless, this Comment's analysis of Internet copyright infringement legislation is still
valid to the issues of service provider knowledge, overly burdensome notice, multiple
exemptions, and the policy of enforcing copyrights on the Internet.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power in the field of copyright).
2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 506 (1994).
3. See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
4. See Copyright on the Internet-Promise & Perils: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter S. 1146 Hearings] (statement of Cary H.
Sherman, Senior Executive Vice-President and General Counsel, Recording Industry
Association of America) (available in 1997 WL 545714).
5. See id.
6. The Internet poses new issues in a variety of legal areas. See generally Howard L.
Steele, Jr., Comment, The Web That Binds Us All: The Future Legal Environment of the
Internet, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 495, 498-503 (1997) (discussing the criminal law issues raised
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
An important copyright issue raised by the growth of the
Internet is the liability of Internet service providers for the
infringements of those who use their services.7 Although the case
law is sparse, courts confronted with this issue have not hesitated
to impose liability on a service provider under appropriate
circumstances.' These decisions have sparked a debate between
copyright industries and service providers.9 The copyright indus-
tries argue that they already lose billions of dollars each year to
copyright infringement ° and the growth of the Internet threatens
to exacerbate the problem: once on the Internet, digital versions of
copyrighted works may be endlessly duplicated with little effort."1
Whereas piracy once required extensive machinery, materials, and
methods of distribution, today, a single copy on a single computer
on the Internet allows worldwide access and unlimited duplication
of the copyrighted work.12
On the other hand, Internet service providers believe that it is
unfair to hold them liable for the infringements of persons who use
their services because it is impossible for them to monitor all the
information that is transmitted by the provider.13 They argue that
such liability would stifle the growth of the Internet and foil the
by the Internet).
7. See National Information Infrastructure: Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Nil Hearings] (testimony of
Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director, Creative Incentive Coalition) (available in 1996 WL
241769).
8. Many courts have applied copyright law by analogizing it to common situations of
non-Internet infringement such as swap meets and dance halls. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D. Cal. 1994))
(analogizing a service provider to a swap meet owner); see also Mary Ann Shulman, Internet
Copyright Infringement Liability: Is an Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a
Dance Hall Operator, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 555, 585 (1997) (discussing the possible
arguments analogizing service provider liability to conventional infringement situations).
9. See Arnold P. Lutzker, Copyright Thieves Simply Because Their Crimes Occurred
Online, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at 18.
10. See Nil Hearings, supra note 7 (testimony of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director,
Creative Incentive Coalition) (available in 1996 WL 241769). Copyright infringement is often
referred to as piracy. See id. Global piracy costs the United States' industries an estimated
$18-20 billion per year. See id.
11. See S. 1146 Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Cary H. Sherman, Senior Executive
Vice-President and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of America) (available
in 1997 WL 545714).
12. See id.
13. See John Gibeaut, Zapping Cyber Piracy, 83 A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (1997).
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purpose of copyright law: to encourage access to information and
discourse. 4
This debate spilled over into Congress in 1995 when the 104th
Congress sought to amend the Copyright Act 15 to recognize its
applicability in a digital age 6 and found itself a referee between
powerful industries. 7 Because these industries failed to reach a
consensus on the issue of service provider liability, Congress was
forced to put the legislation on the back-burner.'" The 105th
Congress has recently turned to the issue once more by drafting
bills that would limit a service provider's liability for infringing
activity on its system: the On-line Copyright Liability Limitation
Act 9 and the Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology
Education Act of 1997. °
This Comment examines how this new legislation will affect
service provider liability. Part II of this Comment provides an
overview of basic copyright law, the pertinent character of the
Internet, the recent case law concerning service provider liability,
and Congress' previous attempts to address the issue. Part III
discusses the changes the bills would make in the existing law, both
in theory and in application. Finally, this Comment asserts that the
courts have been flexible in dealing with copyright law in the
changing medium of the Internet. The courts have not imposed
excessive liability on Internet service providers, nor is there any
indication that such liability is likely to occur (insert a footnote
here). Accordingly, the bills should not be enacted without further
study of their potential chilling effects on the growth of the
Internet.
14. Senator Orin Hatch has framed the issue as "a battle over whether the advance of
the Internet would be retarded because of adverse court rulings or the reluctance of content
owners to make full use of the medium." Lutzker, supra note 9, at 18.
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
16. Congress was successful in addressing only certain copyright issues pertaining to
digital information systems. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39 (1995).
17. The debate centered around bills that proposed minor changes in the Copyright Act.
See National Information Copyright Protections Act, S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995); NIl
Copyright Protection Act, H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995).
18. See Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 62. H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 were never enacted
because of a lack of compromise between service providers and the copyright industries. See
id.
19. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced July 17, 1997).
20. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced September 3, 1997).
19981
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II. Background
A. Copyright Law
1. Policy of Copyright-Copyright law is a complicated
subject21 made more difficult when applied to the Internet. The
purpose of copyright law is to ensure the public's access to
knowledge by encouraging the production of creative works.22 In
practice, there is a tension between this purpose and the rights
granted to accomplish this purpose. Thus, a short summary of basic
copyright law is necessary to understand the issues raised by both
sides in the liability debate.
2. Exclusive Rights-Copyright is a limited property interest
granted to the author of a work that gives the author certain
exclusive rights.2 3 These rights give the copyright holder limited
control over the use and dissemination of the copyrighted work as
well as control over reproduction, distribution, and performance.24
Congress has continually amended the Copyright Act so that these
rights extended into new mediums, including the digital environ-
ment of the Internet.25
3. Direct Infringement-Copyright infringement occurs when
a person violates any of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.
26
Thus, a claim for direct infringement must establish, first, the
ownership of a valid copyright, and, second, copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.27 The ownership element
21. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1963) (ac-
knowledging the typical copyright infringement suit to involve: "[A] legal problem vexing in
its difficulty, a dearth of squarely applicable precedents, a business setting so common that
the dearth of precedents seems inexplicable, and an almost complete absence of guidance
from the terms of the Copyright Act.")
22. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 562.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Copyright protection does not extend to all works, nor
all aspects of a work. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (granting no protection to ideas, procedures,
processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing the exclusive rights).
25. The Copyright Act contains language to facilitate such an extension. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (describing copyright protection as subsisting "in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed"); see also Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39 (1995) (amending performance rights in sound recordings
by providing for a performance right in digital recordings, including those on the Internet).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
27. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). In this
context, copying covers not only reproduction but also a violation of any of the exclusive
[Vol. 103:1
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is usually satisfied by the production of certificates of copyright
showing that the plaintiff is the owner of the copyright.28 The
copying element requires that the plaintiff produce direct evidence
of copying or create an inference that copying occurred.29 This
inference can be created by showing that the defendant had access
to the copyrighted work and that the two works are substantially
similar.3" Direct infringement does not require an intent to
infringe or knowledge of the infringement;3 thus, the Copyright
Act imposes strict liability.32
4. Contributory Infringement-Courts have further developed
the law of copyright infringement by introducing the concepts of
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.33 Contributory
infringement requires that the defendant, first, have knowledge of
the infringing activity, and, second, that the defendant induced,
caused, or materially contributed to the infringing activity.34 The
knowledge element is satisfied when the defendant knows or has
reason to know of the infringing material.35 The participation
element is satisfied if the defendant provided the "site and
facilities" for the infringing activity.36
5. Vicarious Infringement-The other judicial extension of
liability for copyright infringement is the law of vicarious infringe-
ment, which focuses on the relationship between the defendant and
rights granted to the copyright owner. See id.
28. The certificate of copyright creates a presumption that the copyright is valid. See
17 U.S.C. § 410(c). The burden to rebut this presumption is on the party challenging the
copyright. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir.
1993).
29. See Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th
Cir. 1984).
30. See id.
31. Although knowledge or intent is not an element of direct infringement, a lack of
knowledge may make the defendant an innocent infringer and limit the award of damages.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Likewise, evidence of knowledge or intent may make the
defendant a willful infringer and this may entitle the copyright owner to increased statutory
damages. See id.
32. Some courts have modified the strict liability nature of direct infringement when
dealing with the setting of an Internet infringement. See infra Part II.C.1.
33. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
34. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
35. See id. Thus, both actual and constructive knowledge will satisfy this element. See
id.
36. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
1998]
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the direct infringer.37  Vicarious liability requires that the defen-
dant, first, had the right and the ability to supervise the infringing
activity and, second, that the defendant had a direct financial
interest in such activities. 38  The control element is satisfied when
the defendant had a contractual ability to control the direct infring-
er,39 when the defendant had the ability to impose rules and
regulations on the direct infringer,' or when the defendant
promoted the direct infringer.41 The direct financial benefit
element is satisfied when the infringing activities provide a direct
benefit to the defendant; however, the defendant is not required to
have an actual stake in the direct infringing activities."
B. The Internet
The severity of copyright infringement on the Internet is due,
in part, to the attitude of Internet users toward intellectual property
and piracy, and the origin of this attitude can be found in the
Internet's unique character. Furthermore, the Internet presents
special obstacles to the enforcement of copyright law in a digital
age. Therefore, in order to understand the debate over service
provider liability, a discussion of the unique history, culture, and
nature of the Internet is necessary.
1. The History of the Internet-The Internet began in the
1960's with the development of the ARPAnet by the United States
Military.43  Originally, the ARPAnet connected computers
37. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
The origins of vicarious liability are in cases of landlord-tenant or employer-employee
relationships. See, e.g., id.; Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443
F.2d at 1159.
38. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1161-62.
39. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308 (finding control sufficient when the defendant had
contractual power to regulate the direct infringer's business, discharge infringer's employees,
and handle infringer's accounting).
40. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (finding control sufficient when defendant had the
ability to make rules regarding the operation of the premises which the infringer used to sell
bootleg records).
41. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63 (finding control sufficient when the defendant
helped to book and promote local community concerts at which copyrighted music was
performed).
42. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64 (finding a direct financial benefit when the
defendant received fees from admission, parking, and concessions at swap meet that sold
bootleg records).
43. See Steele, supra note 6, at 497. The name ARPAnet comes from the Advanced
Research Project Agency of the Department of Defense that developed the network. See
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operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities
conducting defense-related research" and was used primarily by
researchers and scientists.45 The network grew steadily until the
1990's when it exploded into what it is today: a globe-spanning
civilian network connecting individual users, businesses, organiza-
tions, and governments.
46
2. The Nature of the Internet-The Internet has many
component parts including electronic mail ("e-mail"), newsgroups,
chat rooms, and the World Wide Web ("the Web"). 47  These
components allow documents to be copied from computer to
computer over the Internet.48 Each Internet site has its own
"address" that is used to navigate the myriad computers and
documents that make up the Internet.
49
Access to the Internet has never been easier: persons can gain
access through educational institutions, employment, community
organizations, or through commercial Internet service providers.5 0
Such providers vary. Some give their users access to the Internet
by transmitting data through the provider's system with little
creation or policing of content.5' Other providers supply addition-
al services beyond Internet access, such as chat-rooms, mailing lists,
id.
44. See id. The ARPAnet was designed to allow military communications to survive in
the event of a nuclear war even if some portions of the network were destroyed. See id.
45. See ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTF, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 68 (1997).
46. See id. The Internet's rate of growth has been phenomenal: the number of "host
computers" (those computers that store information and relay communications on the
Internet) has increased from less than 300 in 1981 to an estimated 16 million in 1997. See
143 CONG. REC. S8723-07, S8729 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
Approximately sixty percent of the host computers are located in the United States. See
CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTr, supra note 45, at 68. The number of users on the Internet has
increased from one million in 1994 to about 40 million in 1997. See 143 CONG. REC. S8723-
07, 8729 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). The number of users on the
Internet grows at a rate of roughly ten percent or 5000 per month. See CAVOUKIAN &
TAPCOTr, supra note 45, at 68.
47. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
48. See id. Such documents may contain text, sound, pictures, and video. See id.
49. See id. at 2335.
50. See id. at 2334. Commercial Internet service providers provide access to almost 12
million subscribers for a monthly fee. See id.
51. See Microsoft to Help Corporates Set Up Websites, FIN EXPRESS, Oct. 1, 1997
(available in 1997 WL 13635638).
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and on-line catalogues.52 These providers are more likely to
police existing content and create their own new content.53
3. The Culture of the Internet-Because the Internet devel-
oped without planning, it has largely been self-regulated.54 This
unique history is reflected in the lax attitudes of many Internet
users toward intellectual property issues: that everything on the
Internet is "free" or at least should be "free." 5  While business
and industry now embrace the technology as a new frontier in
which to reach consumers,56 much of the information on the
Internet remains accessible at little or no cost to the user.57 Thus,
persons who might hesitate to pirate copyrighted material by
conventional means do not think twice about downloading a new
song or piece of software from an Internet site.
58
4. Problems of Enforcement-Copyright owners seeking to
enforce their rights must deal with many problems posed by the
Internet's unique character. 9 First, the Internet's enormous size
and international character make detecting infringements diffi-
cult.' The infringers themselves are also difficult to find because
they have no fixed address and their crimes occur over a communi-
cation system rather than in a concrete locale.6' Therefore, simply
bringing a suit can be difficult because copyright owners often
"don't know who to sue."
62
Even after the infringement and infringer are discovered, the
problems do not end; the Internet compounds existing legal
difficulties and creates new ones. First, the Internet poses
jurisdictional problems that a court must resolve before examining
52. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
53. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
54. See Steele, supra note 6, at 503 (discussing new solutions for regulating crime on the
Internet).
55. See Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 63.
56. See S. 1146 Hearings, supra note 4 (testimony of Daniel Burton, Vice-President,
Novell Corporation, discussing the present and future of commerce on the Internet)
(available in 1997 WL 545715).
57. See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2335.
58. See Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 63.
59. See Dominic Bencivenga, Protecting Copyrights; Law and Technology Out of Sync
in Digital Age, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 16, 1997, Corporate Update at 5.
60. See Lutzker, supra note 9, at 18.
61. See id.
62. Bencivenga, supra note 59, at 5.
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the merits of the underlying claim.63 Second, case law is sparse
because the widespread use of the Internet is a relatively recent
phenomenon.' Third, the Internet is "a unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication, 65 and, thus, pres-
ents difficulties in applying legal concepts that were not developed
with the Internet in mind.66 Finally, even if an infringer is located
and brought to trial, the infringer may not have the resources to
pay damages.
67
C. Recent Case Law
Recent case law has addressed the issue of service provider
liability.' Much of the debate is a reaction and overreaction to
these decisions. A discussion of the current state of the law is
necessary to fully understand the arguments on both sides of the
debate.
1. Direct Infringement-A service provider's potential liability
for direct infringement depends on the acts undertaken by the
provider in supplying its services. In Religious Technology Center
v. Netcom On-line Communication Services, Inc. ,69 the first case to
squarely address the issue of service provider liability, the court
held that when a provider's only act is to maintain a system which
automatically transfers data sent by subscribers, the provider will
not be liable for direct infringement.7" The Netcom court noted
that "[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute, there should
still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking
where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a
third party."71
63. See generally James H. Aiken, The Jurisdiction of Trademark and Copyright Infringe-
ment on the Internet, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1331 (1997) (discussing jurisdictional issues in
copyright law on the Internet).
64. The first case to address the issue of copyright online was Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
65. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
66. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1368-69 & n.1-12 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing difficulties in fitting traditional legal
concepts into the factual setting of the Internet).
67. See Bencivenga, supra note 59.
68. See infra notes 69-102 and accompanying text.
69. 907 F. Supp. 1361.
70. See Id. at 1370-71.
71. Id. In doing so, the Netcom court modified the strict liability nature of copyright
infringement and declined to follow the decision in Frena which held that a bulletin board
1998]
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Other courts have followed Netcom by refusing to impose
liability unless there is some evidence of volitional conduct.72
Furthermore, some courts have found no element of volition when
the provider's acts went beyond mere automatic transmission.73
For example, in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia, the court held
that a bulletin board operator was not liable for direct infringement
even though it knew of the infringements and solicited subscribers
to upload the infringing material.74
However, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh,
Inc.," the court held that a bulletin board operator was liable for
direct infringement even though the operator's acts were similar to
the defendant's acts in Sega.76 The Hardenburgh court agreed
with the Sega and Netcom decisions, but found that the defendant's
additional act of using a screening procedure77 satisfied the
volitional element.78 Thus, while the simple act of transmission is
not a sufficient volitional act, it is uncertain what additional
conduct is sufficient to constitute a volitional act.
2. Contributory Infringement-Although a service provider's
actions may not be sufficient to subject it to direct liability, the
operator could be held liable without intent or knowledge. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Service provider cases after Netcom have
followed the Netcom decision by requiring substantial volitional acts beyond automatic trans-
mission before imposing liability on a service provider for direct infringement. See, e.g.,
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
72. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Russ
Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 503; Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip.
Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
73. See Sega Enters. Ltd., 948 F. Supp. at 932. The provider in Sega was the operator
of a bulletin-board service where subscribers could obtain bootleg video games. See id. at
927. Although the defendant was not an Internet service provider, the court followed the
Netcom reasoning and treated the two situations as analogous. See id. at 932.
74. See id.
75. 982 F. Supp. at 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
76. See id. at 503; Sega Enters. Ltd., 948 F. Supp. at 932.
77. During this procedure, the bulletin board employees selected the files to be made
available for downloading from the files uploaded by subscribers. See Russ Hardenburgh,
982 F. Supp. at 513. The employees then moved the selected files into the area from which
subscribers could download. See id.
78. See id. In doing so, the court followed Netcom and distinguished Frena in which the
provider's bulletin-board allowed users to directly upload files into the available download
area and, thus, had no such screening process. See Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 513
(finding that the facts "transform[ed the defendants] from passive providers of a space in
which infringing activities happened to occur to active participants in the process of copyright
infringement").
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provider may still be liable for contributory infringement.7 9 A
claim for contributory infringement requires that the provider knew
of the infringing activity, and that the provider induced, caused, or
materially contributed to the infringing activity.
80
a. Knowledge of the Infringement-The knowledge element
is satisfied if the provider has actual or constructive knowledge.1
In Netcom, the court denied the provider's motion for summary
judgment on the contributory infringement claim because the
copyright owner raised a genuine issue of fact as to the provider's
knowledge by notifying the provider of the infringing activity.82
Moreover, in Sega, the court held that the provider had knowledge
of the infringing activity due to the fact that the provider moni-
tored or had the ability to monitor the downloading and uploading
that occurred on its system.83
b. Substantial Participation-While courts have been reluctant
to impose direct liability without substantial action by the provider,
less substantial action may suffice to impose liability for contributo-
ry infringement.' The Netcom court held that once the knowl-
edge element is satisfied, merely providing the automatic service of
transmission satisfies the participation element.8 Furthermore, in
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,86 the court held that
providing the facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to
show substantial participation.' In that case, the defendant's
79. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
80. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
81. See id.
82. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1381. Netcom had actual knowledge upon receipt of
the notice from the copyright owner. See id. at 1374. However, there was still a question
of fact as to whether Netcom had knowledge of the infringing activity occurring after
receiving notice. See id.
83. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
84. Compare Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (holding that the act of automatic
transmission is insufficient to subject the provider to direct liability), with id. at 1375 (holding
that automatic transmission is sufficient to subject the provider to contributory liability).
85. See id.
86. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
87. See id. at 264. Fonovisa concerned the liability of a swap meet operator for the
infringing activity of the swap meet vendors. See id. Although not an Internet service
provider case, Fonovisa has been cited by several courts in their analysis of service provider
liability. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd., 948 F. Supp. at 932-33; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ
Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. 503, 514 (N.D. Ohio 1997). Commentators have also recognized
the situations as roughly analogous. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 585.
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supplying of support services to the direct infringers was enough to
show a material contribution to the infringing activity.8
Thus, courts will find that a provider participated in the
infringing activity when the provider supplied a central depository
site for the infringing material, allowed users to download the
infringing material, or actively solicited users to upload infringing
materials.8 9 In addition, courts are even more likely to find
substantial participation when the provider has organized the
infringing material on its system to facilitate easier downloading.9"
3. Vicarious Infringement-No court has found a service
provider liable for vicarious infringement, but copyright owners and
commentators believe that such a claim is viable.91 Vicarious
liability requires that the provider have the right and ability to
control the infringing activity and that the provider receives a direct
financial benefit from the activity." Thus, analysis of vicarious
liability focuses on the alleged infringing persons rather than the
infringing act itself.93
a. Right and Ability to Control-The control element requires
an examination of the provider's relationship with the infringer.94
In Netcom, the court held that the provider's contractual right to
take remedial action against its subscribers was sufficient to satisfy
the control element.95 The court also cited the provider's prohibi-
tion against infringement and its requirement that subscribers
indemnify it for any damage to third parties as examples of
control.96 Moreover, the evidence showed that the provider had
exercised this right numerous times.97
88. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (stating that "it would be difficult for the infringing
activity to take place in the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided
by the [defendant]").
89. See Sega Enters. Ltd., 948 F. Supp. at 933.
90. See id.
91. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 585.
92. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1161-62 (2d Cir. 1971).
93. See id.
94. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
95. See id. at 1375-76. This right was contained in Netcom's terms and conditions to
which subscribers must agree. See id. at 1375.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1376.
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b. Direct Financial Interest-Although the Netcom court
found the control element satisfied, it refused to impose vicarious
liability because the fixed fees received by the provider did not
satisfy the direct financial interest element.98 The court held that
there was no evidence that the infringements enhanced the value
of the provider's services or attracted new subscribers.99 Thus,
under this rationale, it is unlikely that a service provider would be
held liable for vicarious infringement.
However, the Netcom decision was based in part on the district
court decision in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,'00 which
has since been reversed. °1 In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a swap meet owner received a direct financial
benefit from the fixed fee paid by vendors, the concession sales,
and parking fees.1"2 Thus, following the reversal of the district
court decision, the liability of a service provider for vicarious
infringement is somewhat in question.0 3
D. Previous Attempts at Legislation
Service providers feared that they would face extreme liability
for copyright infringement in the wake of the Netcom and Sega
decisions.'0" Moreover, the courts were not alone in provoking
this fear; Congress was attempting to clarify the application of the
copyright law to digital media.0 ' In September of 1995, the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights issued its final
report entitled "Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure," popularly known as the "White Paper."'1 6  The
98. See id. at 1376-77.
99. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377.
100. 947 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
101. See Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. See id. at 263.
103. As of the date of this Comment, no court has used Fonovisa for the proposition that
a service provider receives a direct financial benefit from its fixed fees. However, articles
that discuss Fonovisa's impact on service provider liability suggest that the Fonovisa decision
may be used to impose vicarious liability. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 8, at 585.
104. See Jeffrey P. Cunard & Albert L. Wells, The Evolving Standard of Copyright
Liability Online, 497 PLI/Pat 365, 372 (1997).
105. See, e.g., Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39 (1995) (amending the Copyright Act to include a digital performance right); NIl
Copyright Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995); National Information
Copyright Protection Act of 1995, S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995).
106. The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights was a part of the Information
Infrastructure Task Force established by President Clinton to make recommendations on
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main thrust of the White Paper was that current copyright law
should be applied to the Internet and that only minor changes were
needed to facilitate this application." 7
Congress used the White Paper's recommendations as the basis
for the NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 ("NII Act"),
10 8
which proposed several minor amendments to the Copyright
Act.109 The NII Act was to amend the right of distribution t°
to include an express recognition that public distribution may occur
by transmission."' Furthermore, the NII Act was to amend the
definition of "publication" to include publication by transmis-
sion."' Finally, the NII Act was to amend the definition of
"transmit" to include any copy "fixed beyond the place from which
it was sent."'' 13 These changes would have recognized that copies
made by digital communication systems implicate the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner and, thus, would have ensured the
application of copyright law to these systems.
1 14
The introduction of the NII Act caused an outcry of opposition
from service providers who believed the NII Act would subject
them to unlimited liability for their subscribers' infringements."'
Service providers argued that the NII Act would unfairly impose
liability for the mere transmission of infringing material because it
is impossible for them to monitor all the information moving
through their systems.11 6  In contrast, the content providers
viewed the NII Act as merely "confirming the current status of the
law."1
1 17
intellectual property issues. See Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 62.
107. See Legislation: Panel Sees Examples of On-line Copyright Infringement, Asks Who
Should Be Liable, 52 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 36 (1996).
108. See H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995).
109. This legislation "nearly mirrored" the recommendations made in the White Paper.
See Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 62.
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)(1994).
111. See H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. § 2(a).
112. See id. § 2(b)(1) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
113. See id. § 2(b)(2) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101).
114. See id. The courts have already recognized that digital copies can implicate the
rights of a copyright owner. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing MAI Syss. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)).
115. See Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 62.
116. See id.
117. NIl Hearings, supra note 7, at 10 (testimony of Daniel Burton, Vice-President of
Governmental Relations, Novell, Inc.) (available in WL 238585).
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Accordingly, the service providers sought an amendment to the
proposed NII Act limiting their infringement liability,1 8 and a
formal negotiation process commenced between the service
providers and the content providers. 9 The parties, however,
were unable to reach a consensus concerning proposals to limit
service provider liability.2° As a result, the bills were never
enacted and the debate among lawmakers, commentators, service
providers, and copyright industries intensified. 21
III. Analysis
The first session of the 105th Congress has attempted to
address the issue of service provider liability by introducing two
separate bills: the On-line Copyright Liability Limitation Act
122
and the Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education
Act of 1997.123 Each bill proposes to add a new section to the
Copyright Act that would exempt a service provider from liability
for direct, contributory, and vicarious infringements.24 These
exemptions seek to clarify copyright law, foster the growth of the
Internet, and protect the rights of copyright owners.2 5  This
Comment, however, asserts that the bills do not effectively address
the issue of service provider liability because they fail to fulfill
these purposes.
A. Provisions of the On-line Copyright Liability Limitation Act
1. General Exemption from Liability-The House Bill would
exempt a service provider from liability for direct, vicarious, or
contributory infringement "based solely on transmitting or
118. See id. at 19.
119. These negotiations were conducted under the direction of the courts and Intellectual
Property Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. See Nil Hearings, supra note
7, at 12 (statement of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director, Creative Incentive Coalition)
(available in WL 241769).
120. Similar provisions are at the center of the new legislation proposed by the 105th
Congress. See Cunard & Wells, supra note 104, at 372-73.
121. See Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 62.
122. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced July 17, 1997).
123. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced Sept. 3, 1997).
124. Both propose that the new section appear as Section 512 of the Copyright Act. See
H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. § 2(a); S. 1146, 105th Cong. § 102(a).
125. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. § 101; see also 143 CONG. REC. S 8723-07, S 8728 (daily ed.
Sept. 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (introducing the Senate bill and discussing its
purposes).
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otherwise providing access to material on-line .. ,,126 The
exemption for contributory liability does not extend to injunctive
relief.127 Rather, injunctive relief is available only when it is
technically feasible and economically reasonable for a provider to
carry out.
128
2. Disqualifying a Provider from Exemption-The exemption
does not cover all service providers; the exemption would be
removed if a service provider engaged in certain activities 129 and
had knowledge that the material was infringing. 13  When a
service provider has had its exemption removed, the normal law of
infringement liability would apply.
a. Activities Required for Removal of the Exemption-The bill
requires that the service provider engage in certain activities before
the exemption would be removed; for example, when the provider
1311113placed, generated, selected, altered,132 or advertised133 the
infringing material.3 Additional activities include when a service
provider determined the recipients of the material13 or received
a direct financial benefit from a particular act of infringement.
1 36
b. Provider's Knowledge of the Infringing Material-In
addition, removal of the exemption requires that the provider had
knowledge that the material is infringing.' A service provider
has knowledge that the material is infringing if the service provider
had notice or other information indicating that the material was
infringing.138 The bill expressly states, however, that providers
have no duty to acquire such knowledge.139 Moreover, a service
provider who had knowledge, but is prohibited by law from
126. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2, § 512 (a)(1).
127. See id. § 512(a)(2).
128. See id.
129. See id. § 512(a)(1)(A)-(E).
130. See id. § 512(a)(1)(F)(i).
131. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2, § 512(a)(1)(A).
132. See id. § 512(a)(1)(B).
133. See id. § 512(a)(1)(E).
134. Engaging in any one of these activities would deny the provider the benefit of the
exemption. See id. § 512(a).
135. See id. § 512(a)(1)(C).
136. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2, § 512(a)(1)(D).
137. See id. § 512(a)(F)(i).
138. See id.
139. See id. § 512(a)(2).
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accessing the infringing material, would still enjoy the exemp-
tion.
140
3. Further Liabilities-The House Bill also addresses liabilities
for removal of access to materials and misrepresentation of
infringing material.141  A service provider is not liable for any
claim based on its removal of material if the removal is in response
to information or notice indicating that the material is infring-
ing.142  Furthermore, "any person who knowingly materially
misrepresents that material on-line is infringing" is liable to any
person who relies on the misrepresentation and removes the
material.143 The person who relies on the misrepresentation may
recover costs and attorney's fees.144
B. Provisions of the Digital Copyright Clarification and
Technology Education Act
The Senate Bill, like its. House counterpart, would exempt a
service provider from direct, vicarious, or contributory liability for
the infringing acts of its users.145  The Senate Bill, however, is
more comprehensive because it provides two exemptions, one for
supplying services and the other for infringing materials.1 46  The
Senate Bill also establishes a procedure for notifying service
providers of infringing materials so that the materials can be
removed.147
1. Exemption for Supplying Services-First, the Senate Bill
would exempt a service provider from liability for supplying certain
services or facilities to an infringing user."4 A service provider
would incur no liability for supplying transmission services to an
infringing user unless such transmission involved the "generation or
material alteration" of content by the provider. 149  Nor would a
provider incur liability for supplying private and real-time commu-
140. See id. § 512(a)(1)(F)(ii). This covers situations in which privacy laws may prohibit
a provider from accessing a users e-mail. See id.
141. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 512(b), (d).
142. See id. § 512(b).
143. See id. § 512(d).
144. See id.
145. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(a)(1)-(3) (1997).
146. See id. § 512(a)-(b).
147. See id. § 512(b)(1)-(3).
148. See id. § 512(a)(1)-(3).
149. Id. § 512(a)(1)(B).
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nications services t5 ° or information location tools 5' to an in-
fringing user. Thus, providers would be exempt from liability for
supplying basic on-line services.
2. Exemption for Material Residing on a Network
a. General Exemption-Second, the Senate Bill would exempt
a service provider from liability for infringing materials residing on
a system controlled by the service provider. a52  This exemption
would be removed when the service provider placed the materi-
al, a" 3 determined the content of the material,154 or contracted
for the placement of the material to be offered as part of the
provider's service.155
b. Notice and Takedown-A service provider will remain
exempt from liability unless it had notice that the material is
infringing 5' and failed to remove, disable, or block access to the
material.157 Under this procedure for notice and takedown, 58
a service provider is presumed to lack notice that the materials
were infringing unless the provider has received valid notifica-
tion"' To be valid, the notice must pertain only to material that
resides on a system controlled and operated by or for the service
provider.16° Furthermore, the notice must be submitted to the
place designated for notification, 6' must be signed by the copy-
right owner,162 must provide the telephone number and address
150. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 512(a)(2). These services include voice
messaging, electronic mail and chat rooms. See id.
151. See id. § 512(a)(3). These tools include a site-linking aid or directory such as a
hyperlink or a navigational aid such as a search engine or browser. See id.
152. See id. § 512(b)(1).
153. See id. § 512(b)(2)(A).
154. See id. § 512(b)(2)(B).
155. See § 512(b)(2)(C).
156. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(b)(1).
157. See id. A provider has ten days or until receipt of a court order, whichever occurs
first, to takedown the material. See id.
158. "Takedown" is shorthand for any method of removing access to the infringing
material, but not necessarily removal of the material itself. See 143 CONG. REC. S 8723-07,
8729 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997)(statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
159. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(b)(3)(A).
160. See id. § 512(b)(3)(A)(i).
161. See id. § 512(b)(3)(A)(ii). The place where notice is to be submitted must be
displayed on the provider's system. See id.
162. See id. § 512(b)(3)(A)(iii).
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of the complaining party,163 must describe the allegedly infringing
material,"6 and must provide reasonable proof of a valid copy-
right)65 Finally, the notice must contain a sworn statement that
the information contained in the notice is accurate and that the
party has a good faith belief that the use of the material constitutes
infringement. 166
3. Other Liabilities-The Senate Bill also addresses liability
for removal of access to materials and misrepresentation of
infringing material.167 A provider is not liable for any claim
based on the person's removal of material if the removal is in
response to official notice complying with the Act.168 Further-
more, any person who materially misrepresents in an official notice
that material on-line is infringing is liable for statutory damages
and any actual damages including costs and attorney's fees.
16 9
That person is liable to the actual copyright owner or alleged
infringer for the removal 7 ' and to any person who relied on the
misrepresentation and removes the material. 1 '
C. Application
In order to understand the changes the bills would make to the
existing law, an application of the bills to the facts in Netcom is
helpful. This application will focus on the provisions of the Senate
Bill due to its more comprehensive nature.
1. Direct Infringement-In order to prevail on its claim of
direct infringement, the copyright owner must first show that
Netcom is not entitled to the exemptions contained in the Senate
Bill.172 Netcom's only act of copying occurred solely as a result
163. See id. § 512(b)(3)(A)(iv).
164. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(b)(3)(A)(v). The description must be
"sufficient to permit [the provider] expeditiously to identify and locate the material." Id.
165. See id. § 512(b)(3)(A)(vi). Reasonable proof includes a certificate of copyright
registration, a filed application for such registration, or a court order stating that the material
is not authorized by the copyright owner. See id.
166. See id. § 512(b)(3)(A)(vii). The bill also permits the Register of Copyrights to
require a payment at the time of notification in order to deter frivolous or de minimus
notices. See id. sec. 102(a), § 512(b)(3)(A)(viii).
167. See id. § 512(b)(4) and (5).
168. See id. § 512(b)(5).
169. See S. 1146, 10th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(b)(4).
170. See id. § 512(b)(4)(A).
171. See id. § 512(b)(4)(B).
172. See id. § 512(a), (b).
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of the automatic mechanisms of its system.173  Moreover, the
automatic transmission did not involve any generation or alteration
of the content. 74 Therefore, Netcom is entitled to the exemption
for supplying transmission services and the copyright owner will not
prevail on its claim of direct infringement.
1 75
In practice, the Senate Bill may not affect the outcome of a
plaintiff's claim for direct infringement because a service provider
is unlikely to be directly liable under recent case law. 76  In
Netcom, the court required that the provider engage in some
volitional act beyond mere transmission. 177  Thus, a service
provider that only transmits the infringing material is not liable and
the exemption has little effect on the outcome.
Application of the exemption becomes a closer issue when a
service provider engages in additional acts such as the soliciting and
screening of material.1 78  At some point these additional acts will
shift a service provider from a passive transmitter to an active
infringer.'79 Existing case law is uncertain as to what additional
acts are sufficient for direct infringement. 80 Likewise, there is a
range of conduct that falls short of "generation or material
alteration of content," but may still be considered direct infringe-
ment. "' In these situations, the bill may exempt the party that
is most responsible for infringements.182
173. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
174. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361. Liability for transmission will only result when a
provider generates or materially alters the content. See supra Part II.B..1.
175. See S. 1146, sec. 102(a), § 512(a).
176. See Netcorn, 907 F. Supp. at 1370.
177. See id.
178. Such situations are more likely to occur in the context of bulletin board operator
than a large Internet service provider. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923,
932 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
179. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (holding that defendant's additional actions beyond mere transmission
"transformed" him into an active participant).
180. In light of the Sega and Hardenburgh decisions, the additional acts sufficient to
impose liability are uncertain. The Sega court held that the additional act of soliciting the
material was insufficient for liability. See Sega Enters. Ltd., 948 F. Supp. at 932. Although
the Hardenburgh court found the defendant liable for direct infringement, it put great
emphasis on the defendant's act of employing a screening process. See Russ Hardenburgh,
982 F. Supp. at 513.
181. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 512(a)(1)(E), (F)(i) (1997).
182. In its finding that the service provider was not directly liable, the Netcom court
emphasized the fact that there was another party that was more responsible for the
infringements. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372. Thus, when a service provider's acts are
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2. Contributory Liability-To prove contributory infringe-
ment, the copyright owner must show that Netcom had knowledge
of the infringing activity and substantially participated in the
activity.'83 However, the copyright owner must first show that
Netcom is not entitled to the exemption. 1"4 Again, Netcom's only
act of copying occurred solely as a result of the automatic mecha-
nisms of its system.185 Thus, Netcom will receive the benefit of
the transmission exemption because it did not generate or alter the
content of the transmission.'86
In Netcom, however, the copyright owner previously contacted
Netcom and requested that the provider block the infringing
subscriber's access. 87 While this contact was sufficient to raise
the issue of knowledge to defeat Netcom's summary judgment
motion on the contributory infringement claim,' 88 this contact
would be insufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of the Senate
Bill.189  Therefore, under the Senate Bill, Netcom would be
entitled to the exemption and not liable for contributory infringe-
ment.
Alternatively, assuming that the copyright owner had complied
with the notice requirement, Netcom would be in possession of
substantial, such as soliciting and screening the content, the service provider may become the
primary infringer. See Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 513.
183. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373.
184. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102, § 512(a) and (b) (1997).
185. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
186. The exemption from contributory liability granted in the House Bill does not extend
to injunctive relief. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 512(a)(2). Thus, although barred
from damages, the copyright owner could still bring a claim to force Netcom to block access
to the infringing material. See id. The bill, however, requires that the injunctive relief be
"technically feasible and economically reasonable" and the service provider still has no duty
to seek knowledge of the infringing materials. Id. Therefore, prevailing on such a claim may
be difficult.
187. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373.
188. See id. at 1375.
189. Currently, either actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing material will
satisfy the knowledge element of contributory infringement. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N. D. Cal. 1996). Under the House Bill, the exemption
contains "an intermediate standard" between actual and constructive knowledge under which
a person who "becomes aware of information that causes suspicion" has "some obligation"
to investigate. 143 CONG. REC. E1452-01, E1453 (daily ed. July 17, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Coble). See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 512(a)(1)(F)(i). Although an admirable
attempt at compromise, the standard is trying to cut too thin a line and is wrought with
ambiguity. First, there is no guidance as to how strong the suspicion needs to be in order
to trigger the provider's obligation to investigate. See id. Second, there is no guidance as
to what level of investigation will suffice to relieve the provider's obligation. See id.
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valid notice. 9 ' Netcom also failed to block access to the material
and, thus, would not be entitled to the exemption for the materials
residing on its network.191 This raises the issue of the interaction
between the transmission exemption and the materials exemp-
tion.192 The transmission exemption applies to not only the act
of transmission, but to also "intermediate and transient stor-
age.' ' 193 There is no guidance as to when the exemption for such
storage ends and the exemption for more permanent storage
begins. 94 Moreover, there is no indication that failure to qualify
for one exemption removes the possibility of qualifying for the
other exemption. 95
3. Vicarious Infringement-To prove vicarious infringement,
the copyright owner must show that Netcom had the right and
ability to control the infringer's acts and that Netcom received a
direct financial benefit from the infringement. 196 Again, however,
the copyright owner must first show that Netcom is not entitled to
an exemption.
Vicarious infringement raises the same problems as contributo-
ry infringement when interpreting the interaction of the exemp-
tions. Netcom can receive the benefit of the transmission exemp-
tion because it did not generate or alter the content of the
transmission.1 97 Assuming that the copyright owner complied
with the notice requirement, however, Netcom has valid notice.198
Therefore, Netcom is not entitled to the exemption for infringing
material because it had notice and failed to block access to the
material.!99 Whether this notice would remove the transmission
exemption is not clear from the bill's language.
Even without the exemption, liability under the Senate Bill is
not inevitable; the Netcom court refused to find that Netcom
190. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(b)(3) (1997).
191. See id. § 512(b).
192. See id. § 512(a)-(b).
193. Id. § 512(a)(1).
194. See id. § 512(a)-(b).
195. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(a)-(b).
196. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
197. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(a)(1)(B).
198. See id. § 512(b)(3).
199. See id. § 512(b).
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received a direct financial benefit from the fixed fee it charged. 00
Whether the Netcom court would still refuse to find a direct
financial benefit from the fixed fee is uncertain due to the recent
decision in Fonovisa. As previously indicated, the Fonovisa court
found that a swap meet owner received a direct financial benefit
from the fixed fees it charged.2"1
In practice, the bills will most affect situations in which a
provider meets the elements of vicarious liability, but has no
knowledge of the infringements.0 2  In these situations, the
procedure for notice and takedown would allow a provider to avoid
liability until it receives valid notice.0 3
D. Policy Debate: Do the Bills Fulfill Their Purposes?
The bills seek to clarify copyright law, foster the growth of the
Internet, and protect the rights of copyright owners. Yet, if enacted,
the bills may have the opposite effect.2" Copyright owners who
cannot enforce their rights will be reluctant to distribute their
works on the Internet, thus resulting in less available content.0 5
In addition, recent case law may allow greater flexibility in
application to the rapidly changing Internet. Therefore, Congress
should avoid granting the exemptions contained in these bills
without further study of their possible chilling effects.
1. Clarification of Copyright Law on the Internet-The bills
seek to clarify the application of copyright law to the Internet by
defining the rights and liabilities of copyright owners and service
providers.20 6  The ambiguous language and provisions, however,
may diminish rather than enhance the clarity of copyright law.
200. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377 (holding that the provider was not liable for
vicarious infringement); see also Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs.,
983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (granting summary judgment to the defendant on the issue
of vicarious liability, although the plaintiff had not alleged the issue). The plaintiffs in Sega
and Hardenburgh probably could have alleged vicarious infringement, but did not. See
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
201. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir.
1963) (discussing the lack of any knowledge element in vicarious infringement).
203. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102, § 512(b).
204. See id. sec. 101.
205. See 141 CONG. REC. S14,547-05, S14,552 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (available in 1995 WL 570637).
206. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 101(1)-(6) (describing the bill's purposes).
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First, the knowledge standard of the House Bill is so ambiguous
that it raises more questions than it settles."7 The bill does not
indicate what constitutes "suspicion," making the trigger for the
provider's obligation to investigate uncertain.2 8 Nor does the bill
indicate the extent of the obligation to investigate.29 This is
likely due to the bill being intended to be "a new starting point for
discussion," rather than a fully crafted piece of legislation.10
Second, the Senate Bill suffers from poor drafting that makes
unclear the application and integration of the exemptions. A
provider's system may make copies of infringing materials as part
of the transmission process.2 11 Once notified that these copies are
infringing, failure to comply with the notice and takedown
procedure removes the exemption contained in that procedure.2
However, the service provider may argue that these copies
constitute "intermediate or transient storage" and, thus, cannot be
the basis for an infringement claim under the transmission
2131ouexemption. This would allow a service provider that had
official notice to avoid liability thereby frustrating the purpose of
a cooperative procedure for notice and takedown. 14
Finally, the bills frustrate the clarity of copyright law by adding
elements of knowledge to direct and vicarious infringement when
previously there were none.215  This may eliminate the practical
differences between the three theories of infringement, causing
confusion for judges, lawyers, service providers, and copyright
owners.
216
207. See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 512(a)(1)(F)(i) (1997).
208. 143 CONG. REC. E1452-01, E1452 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Coble).
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that there is "no question" that copies are created by
the provider's system).
212. See S. 1146, 105th Cong. sec. 102(a), § 512(b)(1) (1997).
213. Id. § 512(a)(1).
214. See id. sec. 101(5)-(6). This problem could be eliminated by applying the require-
ments of the notice and takedown procedure to the transmission exemption, or by stating
that failure to qualify for the notice and takedown exemption disqualifies the provider from
exemption under the transmission provision.
215. See discussion supra Parts II.A.3, II.A.5.
216. See Cunard and Wells, supra note 102, at 369.
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2. Protect the Rights of Copyright Owners-Although the bills
seek to protect the rights of copyright owners, the bills may reduce
such protection in a medium that presents great potential for abuse
of these rights. 217  Copyright owners already have difficulty in
enforcing their rights on the Internet.218 The owner must discover
the infringement, find the infringer, and successfully bring the
infringement claim.219 The exemptions make these tasks more
difficult by allowing service providers to sit back and ignore known
infringing activity until a copyright owner discovers it. This gives
service providers little incentive to work with copyright holders to
stop infringements.
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Furthermore, the requirement of valid notice in the Senate Bill
is onerous in light of the transient nature of the Internet. The
Netcom court recognized that requiring overly burdensome notice
"would be impractical and would perhaps take too long to verify,
making it impossible for a copyright holder to protect his or her
works .. ..,,22' By the time a copyright owner discovers the
infringing material and gathers the documents necessary for notice,
the notice may no longer be valid.22  Copyright owners could
even face liability for such invalid notice that further diminishes the
owner's ability to protect its works. 23 Finally, the fact that the
Internet is still a rapidly developing medium means that any broad
exemption for service providers is premature at best. Therefore, if
the bills are to be enacted, they must be rewritten to provide
greater balance between the rights of copyright owners and service
providers.
3. Foster the Growth of the Internet-Because the bills do not
provide a greater level of clarity and balance than the existing law,
217. See S. 1146 Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Cary H. Sherman, Senior Vice-
President and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of America) (available in
1997 WL 545714).
218. One lawyer described the current state of enforcement as "a finger in the dike."
Bencivenga, supra note 59, at 5.
219. See discussion supra Part II.B.4. (addressing the difficulty of enforcing copyrights on
the Internet).
220. See S. 1146 Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Cary H. Sherman, Senior Executive
Vice-President and General Counsel, Recording Industry Association of America) (available
in 1997 WL 545714).
221. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
222. Notice is valid only if it describes the specific infringing materials. See S. 1146, 105th
Cong. sec. 102, § 512(b)(3)(v) (1997).
223. See id. § 512(b)(4).
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they may stifle the growth of the Internet. The Internet has the
potential to open up new avenues in communication, education,
and commerce.224 It brings people closer to each other and the
government closer to the people.225 It provides students and
educators with a wealth of information,226 and it offers substantial
commercial opportunities and access to a global marketplace.227
In order to fulfill this potential, the Internet needs access to
the content provided by the copyright industries. 228  Without
content, the Internet may end up providing great access to little
229valuable information. The presumption underlying this push
for a legislative exemption is that service providers will face
excessive liability under the existing law of infringement.230
Service providers argue that they may be held liable each time they
transmit infringing materials. 231  Such extreme liability would
stifle the growth of the Internet and foil the purpose of copyright
by discouraging access to knowledge.
2
However, this basic presumption is flawed because the judicial
interpretation of copyright law does not subject service providers
to excessive liability.233 Courts have protected service providers
by reserving liability for particular facts that show direct contribu-
tion in the face of knowledge of the infringing activities. 234 There
has been no deluge of cases imposing liability on service providers
for merely supplying their basic services to a subscriber and there
is no evidence that this is likely.235 Therefore, any broad exemp-
tion for service providers is premature at best and could stifle the
growth of the Internet.
224. See 143 CONG. REC. S8723-07, 8729 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997)(statement of Sen.
Ashcroft) (available in 1997 WL 540684).
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See 141 CONG. REC. S14,547-05, S14,552 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (available in 1995 WL 570637).
229. See id.
230. See Lutzker, supra note 9, at 18.
231. See id.
232. See 143 CONG. REC. S8723-07, 8729 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1997)(statement of Sen.
Ashcroft).
233. See Cunard & Wells, supra note 102, at 393.
234. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-ine Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
235. See Cunard & Wells, supra note 102, at 393.
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IV. Conclusion
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of
copyright infringement short of an exemption for Internet service
providers. One possibility is to regulate copyright on the Internet
through the use of collective licensing.236 Users of copyrighted
material could license this material by paying a fee to an agency
which collects royalties for its members.237 This solution encour-
ages cooperation between legitimate content users and owners, but
is unlikely to have much affect on truly illicit copyright infring-
ers.
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Another possibility is a technological fix that enhances the
ability to prevent and detect infringements on the Internet.239
Such a technological solution includes programs that search the
Internet for unlicenced and infringing copyrighted materials.
240
Other technological solutions may be to utilize digital watermarks
or encryption to prevent the illicit copying of copyrighted informa-
211tion. However, technological measures are unlikely to solve
the issue because such protections have "only a limited shelf
life."
242
The most effective solution to the issue is to encourage
cooperation between Internet service providers and copyright
owners. This may be accomplished by combining the previously
mentioned solutions with legal intervention. However, the most
obvious solution to the issue of service provider liability is to make
no changes to the copyright law. Courts have been remarkably
flexible by only imposing liability in situations in which the
provider had knowledge and engaged in some volitional acts. The
courts will also be better able to adapt to further changes in the
236. See Jane C. Ginsberg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1489 (1995).
237. See Bencivenga, supra note 59, at 5.
238. See Ginsberg, supra note 234, at 1492.
239. See NIl Hearings, supra note 7 (testimony of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director,
Creative Incentive Coalition)(available in 1996 WL 241769).
240. See Sue Zeidler, BMI Sends a Bot for Music Pirates, PITrSBURG POST-GAZETTE,
Oct. 18, 1997, at A2 (describing the use of such a program by Broadcast Music, Inc., a
performance rights licensing group). These programs reduce the manpower necessary for
enforcement of copyright owner's rights. See id.
241. See Bencivenga, supra note 59, at 5.
242. Id. (stating that "[elvery time you try to put some kind of protection on [copyright]
there's always someone out there trying to figure out a way to get around it.")
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paradigm of the Internet. Therefore, Congress should not enact
the bills unless, and until such time as, the case law proves unable
to cope with the issue of service provider liability.
Joshua Alan Daub
